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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This matter involves two Motions to Modify a Decree of Divorce, 
which Motions were brought by defendant (R.39) and (R.84) wherein defendant 
sought modificataion of the original Decree of Divorce entered on October 5, 
1972 (R.24-27). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On June 8, 1977 the defendant filed a Motion to Modify Decree of 
Divorce (~.39), an Affidavit (R.38) and Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
(~.36-37). On the 19th day of September 1977 the Honorable David K. Winder 
heard the Motion and entered his Order on November 30, 1977 (R.60-64). 
On the 17th day of February 1978 defendant filed a second Motion 
for Modification of Decree of Divorce (R.84} with supporting Affidavit (R.81-83). 
On the 5th day of December 1978 defendant filed a Supplemental Affidavit (R.94-99). 
On the 23rd day of January 1979 and the 4th day of December 1979 the matter was 
before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson. On the 14th day of December 
1979 the Court issued a Memorandum Decision (R.117) and entered its Order on 
the 18th day of April 1980 (R. 132). It is from that Order that plaintiff appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The original Decree of Divorce (R.24-27) provided among other things 
for the computation, ·payment and duration of child support. Defendant's 
Motion of June 8, 1977 (R.39) sought modification of the original Decree of 
Divorce on the sole basis that the times at which child support was to 
-1-
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terminate were inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court's statement 
as set forth in Stanton v. St~nton, 427 U.S. 7, 517 P.2d 1010 and Craig~ 
Boren, 97 S.Ct. 451. The defendant did not request the Court consider 
reducing, diminishing or altering his obligation for the payment of child 
sup po rt. 
On the 19th day of September 1977 the Honorable David K. Winder 
heard the matter and issued a Memorandum Decision dated November 15, 1977 
and 1 ater c:i.n 0 rder Modifying Decree of Divorce dated November 30, 1 q77 
(R.60-64). The Court held that the ~!anton cases had no aoplication to the 
instant case. In addition the Court modified paragraph 9 of the original 
Decree of Divorce. The modification did not change the defendant's obliga-
tion for child-support, it simply modified the referenced paragraph to provide 
for the computation of that obligation by reference to Federal Income Tax 
Returns not general records. The original Decree was left totally intact so 
far and to the extent that the defenda~t's obligation for child support 
was concerned. 
On February 17, 1978 the defendant filed a second Motion for 
Modification, this time requesting that the Court -reduce his obligation 
for child support. Hearing on that Motion was concluded before the 
~norable Homer F. Wilkinson on December 4, 1979. Attendant that hearing 
plaintiff asser.ted that the doctrine of res judicata precluded a statement 
or consideration of events or circumstances prior to November 30, 1977 (R. 111-
114) and the Court ruled that the doctrine of res judicata would preclude 
-2-
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evidence of events and circumstances existing prior to the hearing of 
~ptember 17, 1977. The hearing continued through regular conclusion and 
the Court ordered the Decree modified as set forth in its Order of April 18, 
l 9 80 ( R . l 3 2 ) . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID MOT ERR IN FAILHJG TO DISMISS DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO MODIFY DECREE FOR FAILURE TO ALLEGE GROUNDS 
JUSTIFYING MODIFICATION AND AS BEING BARRED BY THE 
PRINCIPLES OF RES JUDICATA 
Defendant's first Mo ti on to Modify Decree of Divorce ( R. 39) was 
brought by the defendant solely for the purpose of ascertaining the validity 
of the provisions of the original Divorce Decree prescribing the termina-
taion of child support at different ages based solely upon sex. The action 
was brought in light of and spawned as a result of recent decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court in Stanton 1 and 2. Attendant the hearing 
before the Honorable David K. Hinder on defendant's first Motion to Modify 
Decree of Divorce, Judge Winder modified portions of the original Decree 
(R.24-27) prescribing the mechanical steps and computations to be used in 
ascertaining the quantom of the defendant's child support obligation. 
Judge Winder's modification did not alter or modify the quantom of defendant's 
child support obligation. The modification was made to streamline and make 
more workable the clumsy and ambiguous fashion in which that computation was to 
be made. 
-3-
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Subsequent to the hearing on defendant's first Motion to Modify 
Decree of Divorce the defendant did on the 17th day of February, 1978, file 
a second Motion for Modification (R.84) on the basis that there had 
transpired the requisite change of circumstances between the time of entry 
of the original Decree on October 25, 1972 and February 12, 1978. In 
addition the defendant filed a Supplemental Affidavit on the 5th day of 
December, 1979, alleging additional factors upon which the requisite change 
of circumstances had occurred, those changes occurring from September 1977. 
Plaintiff claims that the second Motion for Modification was barred by the 
principles of res judicata as to events prior to the first modification 
proceedings. Defendant respectfully submits that the sum and substance of 
the doctrine of res judicata is "that once a matter is officially decided it 
i s f i n a 11 y de c i de d 11 Mas s i e v . Pa u 1 , 9 2 S . W . 2 d 111 4 . A proper a pp 1 i cat i on of 
the doctrine in this matter would require that the matter of a reduction in 
child support was at one time litigated, which litigation defendant respectfully 
submits never occurred. The first time a change of circumstance was plead and 
in fact the subject of judicial consideration was attendant defendant's second 
Motion to Modify the Decree of Divorce. Counsel for plaintiff cites 18 ALR 2d 18, 
which citation we believe is absolutely consistent with the correct application 
of the doctrine and defendant's position in the instant matter. In Hudson v. 
Hudson, 111 P.2d 573 (1941) the appellant petitioned for an award of alimony. 
The Court heard the matter and appellant's specific request and acted thereon. 
Attendant a similar subsequent motion in 1940 the Court held that the issue was 
- 4·-
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whether or not there was the requisite change of circumstance since the 
1938 Order in that at the 1938 hearing the specific matter of an award of 
alimony was considered. In the instant case the hearing before the Honorable 
David K. Winder there was no consideration of a reduction of child support. 
Plaintiff's counsel cites 24 Am Jur 2d, Section 676, Divorce and 
Separation, page 795, with which defendant concurs is an appropriate 
statement of the doctrine of res judicata. 
Defendant contends that if there was err in the lower court the 
err was that testimony and evidence was limited to events occurring after 
the hearing on defendant's first motion. 
Attendant defendant's secant Motion (R.84) the Affidavit (R.81-83) 
and Supplemental Affidavit (R.94-95) thereto defendant alleged and set forth 
seven bases, e.g. grounds, for a change. Those bases, e.g. grounds were 
clearly set forth and alleged in the pleadings provided counsel and in detail 
pursued at trial. Judge Wilkinson as a trier of fact and subsequent to a con-
sideration of all the testimony found that there was the requisite change of 
circumstances and acted thereon. Counsel for plaintiff has attempted to 
consolidate some 259 pages of testimony in his 35 page brief, which summary 
after a thorough perusal of the record does not fairly characterize the basis 
for Judge Wilkinson's determination. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS A SUFFICIENT CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES BETWEEN THE 
FIRST MOTION FOR MODIFICATION AND THE SECOND MOTION FOR 
MODIFICATION TO JUSTIFY GRANTING THE SECOND MOTION 
-5-
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Plaintiff has attempted in three and one quarter pages to attack 
Judge Wilkinson's consideration of 259 pages of testimony and attendant 
Exhibits in which three and one quarter pages of summary plaintiff has 
, failed to overcome the clear changes of circumstance appearing in the record. 
POINT III 
AN ORDER OF MODIFICATION CAN BE SUPPORTED WITHOUT FINDINGS 
OF FACT 
Rule 52(c) U.R.C.P. provides: 
"Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are unnecessary on 
decisions of Motions under Rule 12 or 56 or any other Motions 
except as provided in Rule 4l(b)." 
Wright v. Union Pacific Railroad, 22 Utah 338, 63 P 317, 
wherein the Court ruled that Findings of Fact were required only in a trial on 
merits, Findings on Motion for a new trial were not only not required but were 
neither necessary nor usable in the practice. 
Counsel for plaintiff has failed to cite any authority for the 
proposition crusaded in his Point III and the only factual basis upon which he 
suggests a modification of a very clear rule is that of the duration of the 
testimony. 
POINT IV 
IT IS NOT ERR FOR THE COURT TO UNDERTAKE TO DEFINE THE 
TERM "FULL TIME STUDENT" IN THE PROCEEDING, IN THAT TH.~T 
ISSUE AFFECTS THE QUANTOM OF DEFENDANT'S OBLIGATION TO 
PAY SUPPORT WHICH WAS CLEARLY AND SQUARELY BEFORE THE COURT 
Plaintiff contends that the issue of "fulltime student" was not 
-6-
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before the Court and that by ruling the Court precluded testimony on that 
issue. 
We believe that all issues attendant the defendant's obligation 
to pay child support, length, duration, term and conditions were before the 
Court as a result of defendant's Motion. The Court did nothing more nor 
less than make a determination and prescribe conditions upon which the 
defendant was to be governed, e.g. required or limited from an obligation to 
pay sums of moneys (child support) under certain conditions. 
Plaintiff suggests that if the parties were unable to resolve their 
differences, e.g. determine on their own what 11 fulltime student" means and the 
obligation attendant thereto, that that issue could be handled attendant a 
hearing on an Order to Show Cause. We believe that that remedy is inappropriate 
in that it would require a consideration of what the parties mutual assent 
was at the time they entered into their Stipulation and Agreement (R. 10-13). 
Those were all matters attendant which Judge Wilkinson heard evidence, considered 
evidence and entered his Order. 
CONCLUSIONS 
For the foregoing reasons defendant respectfully requests the Court 
affirm the Order Modifying Decree of Divorce entered by Judge Wilkinson on 
Apri 1 18, 1980. 
Rq;;u~~urtted, ~: 
George S.~Dium . II 
DIUMENTI, HARWARD & NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant and Resoondent 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief 
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October, 1980. 
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